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Abstract  
 Who invents medicines for the poor of the world? This question becomes very
important where the WTO allows low income countries to be unbound by the TRIPS agreement.
This agreement concerns medicines for infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and
malaria. These diseases cause serious damage to low income countries. Under these
circumstances, some scholars wonder if anyone will continue innovative activities related to
treating these diseases. 
 This paper sought to answer this question by collecting and analyzing patent data of
medicines and vaccines for diseases using the database of the Japan Patent Office. Results
indicate that private firms have led in innovation not only for global diseases such as HIV/AIDS
but also diseases such as malaria that are spreading exclusively in low income countries.
Innovation for the three infectious diseases is diverse among firms, and frequent patent
applications by high-performing pharmaceutical firms appear prominent even after R&D
expenditure, economies of scale, and economies of scope are taken into account. 
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important where the WTO allows low income countries to be unbound by the TRIPS 
agreement. This agreement concerns medicines for infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis and malaria. These diseases cause serious damage to low income countries. 
Under these circumstances, some scholars wonder if anyone will continue innovative 
activities related to treating these diseases. 
 This paper sought to answer this question by collecting and analyzing patent data of 
medicines and vaccines for diseases using the database of the Japan Patent Office. Results 
indicate that private firms have led in innovation not only for global diseases such as 
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1. Introduction 
 
Infectious diseases are a serious concern to many people in developing countries. Among all, 
the damage caused by HIV/AIDS4, tuberculosis, and malaria is the most severe. As seen in Table 1, 
the WHO [2002] estimates that three million, 1.9 million and more than 1 million people died in 
2000 due to AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria respectively. Further, a far greater number of newly 
infected people were added to those living with HIV, tubercle bacillus and malaria parasite. The 
number of newly infected people in 2000 was 5.3 million for HIV, 8.8 million for tuberculosis, and 
300 million for HIV. Table 1 further shows that within the context of international development, 
most people with the virus, bacterium, or parasite, are living in developing countries. 
While AIDS was discovered in 1981, developments in diagnosis, medicine, and vaccine 
seem to have been greater for tuberculosis and malaria, diseases which have been prevalent for a 
long time. Above all, one of the most promising inventions for HIV/AIDS has been the antiretroviral 
(ARV) that prevents HIV by using an enzyme called reverse transcriptase to convert RNA into DNA. 
Taking antiretroviral drugs regularly in appropriate combinations prevents destruction of the immune 
system of people living with HIV. However, patent holders have monopolized sales and distribution 
of the antiretroviral drugs where the substance patent system has been applied to pharmaceuticals.5 
Thus, drugs have been prohibitively expensive for people living in developing countries. 
In November 2001, an epoch-making breakthrough took place at the Fourth Ministerial 
Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Doha, Qatar.6  At the conference, a 
Declaration on the TRIPS7 Agreement and Public Health was released, and this stated that patents 
should not be applied in cases where keeping the TRIPS Agreement would result in serious damage 
                                                        
4 AIDS is the abbreviation of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. It is caused by the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). Infection of HIV gradually destroys the immune system, and 
infected people become susceptible to “opportunistic illness,” such as tuberculosis, Pneumocystis 
carinii pneumonia, Kaposi's sarcoma, and Candidiasis. People living with HIV are more likely to be 
infected due to destruction of the immune system than those without HIV. Infection with any of the 
opportunistic illnesses is very dangerous for people living with HIV. 
5 In many countries, there is an inclination for patents on medicines to be waived on the grounds of 
public health. Even at the end of the 1980’s, forty countries, including developed countries, did not 
admit substance patents on medicines but only process patents (Lanjouw and Cockburn [2001], p. 
265). 
6 One thing that drove the conference forward to the declaration was a rise in public sentiment 
supporting people living with HIV rather than pharmaceutical companies owning patents of 
antiretroviral drugs. This issue was pushed in order to persuade companies to lower their prices 
below the level at which drugs would be affordable to people with HIV who are living in developing 
countries, and it resulted in concessions of companies relative to trials on patents of the drugs in 
Brazil and South Africa in 2001. Bio-terrorism, which included the case of anthrax in North America 
in October 2001 (right after the September 11), also helped raise concerns about the importance of 
public health over intellectual property rights of delegates, not only in developing countries but also 
in developed countries. See Economist [2001a, b, 2002a] and Cassier and Correa [2003]. 
7 This is the abbreviation of trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights. 
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to public health.8 More concretely, clause No. 4 of the declaration states the following: 
 
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking 
measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the 
TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and 
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect public health and, 
in particular, to promote access to medicines for all. 
In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO members to use, to the full, the provisions 
in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose. 
 
The agreement incorporated into the declaration in Doha heightened the bargaining power 
of low income countries over multinational pharmaceutical companies in determining prices of 
antiretroviral drugs and those for tuberculosis and malaria (which were explicitly mentioned in the 
declaration). As a result, costs for treatment with antiretroviral drugs declined from around thirty US 
dollars per day per person in the middle of 1998 to one dollar in the beginning of 2002 (Economist 
[2002]). This was a revolutionary achievement for people living with HIV, even though only around 
30,000 people out of 25 million people living with HIV in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2003 received 
antiretroviral therapy. 
In terms of wide distribution of drugs, the decline in prices of antiretroviral drugs is 
undoubtedly favorable when seen as a measure against HIV/AIDS. However, the same decline in 
prices may be potentially harmful to further development of innovations in medicines, therapies, and 
vaccines for HIV/AIDS, because low prices reduce profits of pharmaceutical firms, and these firms 
may lose their incentive to make innovations. This is a concern not only HIV/AIDS but also any 
disease that is prevalent in low-income countries. Pharmaceutical firms may expect to be forced by 
the government and by international organizations to reduce prices of any medicines, therapies and 
vaccines which are helpful and critical to either prevention, cure, or treatment in low income 
countries, even though governments and international organizations have promised that they will not 
do so. That is, ex ante governmental commitment can be withdrawn once the medicine, therapy or 
vaccine has been developed. This is known as “the time inconsistency problem” in the context of 
game theory (Chari, Kehoe and Prescott [1989]; Kremer [2000a]; Kremer and Glennerster [2004]). 
Thus, cautious pharmaceutical companies, without declaring that they will do so, may not want to 
participate in such a risky field of diseases and may shift resources toward innovations in medicines 
for diseases for which the demand will be sure and great in developed countries. They may pretend 
to have lost advantages in innovation of medicines and vaccines for diseases prevalent in developing 
countries, and nobody can disprove this statement. 
                                                        
8 See Lippert [2002] among others. The whole declaration is available at the WTO’s homepage 
(http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm). 
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In fact, pharmaceutical companies and their industrial associations have serious worries 
regarding public sentiment that may be against them. They lobby, publicizing their philanthropic 
activities, and try to persuade the public that the prevalence of HIV/AIDS is not due to patents but 
rather to poverty.9 However, some leaders within the society of pharmaceutical companies have 
already avowed that the industry will retrench R&D for antiretroviral drugs because of price 
constraints (Lanjouw [2002a], p. 109). It is noteworthy that as shown in Table 1, there are a number 
of people living with HIV in rich countries, while the number of people with the malaria parasite is 
almost zero. When pharmaceutical firms lose incentives to create medicines and vaccines for 
HIV/AIDS, they lose even more when it comes to malaria, because the demand based on purchasing 
power for medicines and vaccines for malaria is far smaller than that of HIV/AIDS. There are a 
number of other “neglected diseases” in low income countries. 
That pharmaceutical companies appear to shrink from innovation in low income countries, 
the question of who will lead in innovation for the poor must be raised. In order to predict who will 
lead in the future, it is important to explore who led in the past. For example, who has invented 
medicines and vaccines for malaria and other neglected diseases? Which sector, public institutions or 
private pharmaceutical firms, invested and invented more for medicines and vaccines for diseases 
prevalent in developing countries? What type of institutions and/or firms devoted themselves to such 
unprofitable R&D activities? Answers to these questions will help in the design of schemes to 
stimulate innovation for the poor.10 If public institutions have made the most innovations for the poor, 
then there is no point in discussing the incentive problem caused by the opportunistic behavior of 
governments and international organizations. However, if pharmaceutical companies have 
committed themselves to innovation for the poor, the incentive problem becomes more important, 
and determining the types of companies that make innovation becomes more important in order to 
determine policy measures to promote companies of such types. 
What kinds of entities have led innovation of medicines and vaccines for diseases prevalent 
in low-income countries so far? This is the question addressed in this paper. Viewing the 
characteristics and attributes of entities that contributed to innovation of medicines for the poor in 
the past gives us hints as to what should be done to promote innovation. 
Findings are threefold: First, private pharmaceutical firms have led in the innovation of 
medicines, for not only HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis that are currently prevalent in developed 
countries, but also malaria, which is rare in developed countries. Second, performance among firms 
                                                        
9 These tendencies can be seen on the web sites of pharmaceutical company, Pfizer, and an industrial 
association of pharmaceutical companies in the United States, the International Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations (IFPMA). See http://www.pfizerforum.com/english/ 
lippert.shtml, and http://www.ifpma.org/. 
10 Proposals that would stir innovation of medicines and vaccines for the poor have already been 
publicized. See Kremer [2000a, b, 2002]; Kremer and Glennerster [2004]; Lanjouw [2002b], and 
Pilling [2000]. 
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in innovation for the three infectious diseases is diverse. Third, the number of patent applications of 
medicines made by GlaxoSmithKline for HIV/AIDS and neglected diseases is outstanding. In 
addition to trends over time, a substantial part of this performance is explained by the scale of 
GlaxoSmithKline’s total R&D stock, sales, and economies of scope that are incorporated by the 
variety of diseases for which pharmaceutical companies made patent applications of medicines and 
vaccines. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 includes a brief description of the general facts 
related to the influence of the three infectious diseases and the trends in innovation of medicines and 
vaccines for them. It appears that private pharmaceutical firms outperform public institutions in 
terms of the number of patent applications for medicines and vaccines for the three infectious 
diseases. Section 3 includes an empirical study with data to find determinants of the magnitude of 
patent applications. Due to constraints related to sample size, focus is placed primarily on HIV/AIDS 
and the “neglected diseases” that cause serious problems in some developing countries, but seem not 
to be of concern in the rest of the world. Poisson regression and associated applications are used as 
analytical methods. Conclusions are given in the final section. 
 
 
2. General Facts Regarding the Influence of Infectious Diseases and the 
Development of Innovations in Medicines to Treat Them 
 
This section includes a discussion of general facts related to the influence of the three 
infectious diseases and the development of innovations in medicines and vaccines for their treatment. 
First, the burden imposed on people in the world by these diseases is discussed. This issue is 
important because those who are influenced by a disease affect incentives for coping with the disease. 
People who are seriously affected by a disease are probably more likely to work for innovation of 
medicines than those who are not.  
 
2.1. Burdens of Diseases 
 
There are two types of infectious diseases. One is widespread in both low and high income 
countries; examples include HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. The other is rampant only in low-income 
countries; an example is malaria. As shown in Table 1, most casualties for both types of infectious 
diseases are found in low-income countries. Even if infected people survive, they are destined to 
face various difficulties in their life. Obviously, different infectious diseases create different kinds of 
burdens on infected people. In order to evaluate the magnitude of burdens caused by various diseases 
and injuries, a measure called the Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) was developed. This 
measure incorporates various kinds of damages imposed by diseases and injuries such as death and 
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disability.11 It is tabulated by the factors of disease and injury. Table 2 shows the number of deaths 
(upper row) and the share of DALYs lost due to each disease (lower row) tabulated by region. It is 
evident from the table that the burden of disease varies from region to region. The first column 
indicates that HIV/AIDS accounts for 5.8 percent of the total DALYs lost in the world; this value is 
twice as high as the value for both tuberculosis and malaria. Similar dominance of HIV/AIDS is 
found in terms of the number of deaths. At the regional level of DALYs of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis 
and malaria, Africa suffers the most with East and South Asia following. It is particularly remarkable 
that the share of DALYs lost due to the three diseases accounts for more than 30 percent in Africa. It 
is also noteworthy that the Americas and Europe, parts of developed world, have only negligible 
burdens due to malaria. Table 2 thus suggests that people living in Africa should have more incentive 
to cope with the three diseases than those living in more developed regions such as the Americas and 
Europe. 
 
2.2. Patent Applications by Disease 
 
There is an argument that the number of patents is a good proxy for the number of 
innovations in pharmaceuticals. While R&D activity for medicines costs a large amount of money, 
manufacturing costs are extremely low. Using reverse engineering, imitating an original is very easy 
(Kremer [2002]). Therefore, obtaining patents are the most important way to secure profits from 
R&D investments in the pharmaceutical industry (Scherer [1996], p. 362, Table 9.1, Levin, et al 
[1987], Cockburn and Griliches [1987]). To investigate the tendency of R&D efforts aimed at 
infectious diseases, a database of the Japan Patent Office was examined, and patent applications for 
medicines to be used against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria were retrieved. Due to the Paris 
Convention and the Patent Cooperation Treaty, key patent applications are likely to be made at 
patent offices of major countries at about the same time. Therefore, as far as important patent 
applications are concerned, a database of any particular country suffices for the analysis of 
tendencies in patent applications.12 The Japan Patent Office maintains a patent data retrieving system 
that is available to anyone through the Internet. Appendix 1 explains how samples were retrieved. It 
should be noted that the number of patent applications for tuberculosis and malaria might be 
overestimated. 
Figure 1 shows trends in patent applications related to medicines for HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis and malaria that were submitted to the Japan Patent Office from 1980 to 1998.13 There 
                                                        
11 See Murray and Acharya [1997], World Bank [1993], Appendix B in details. 
12 It is noteworthy that a commercial database named Derwent World Patent Index integrates 
information on patents and citations from the major patent offices in the world. The database is not 
easily available, as it is owned by a private company. 
13 Taking into account the fact that patent applications became open after one and a half years have 
passed since filling, data until 1998 are considered reliable. 
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appears to be a significant difference in the number of patent applications found among the three 
diseases. For example, there was a sharp increase in the number of patent applications related to 
HIV/AIDS for the decade after the first case of AIDS was reported in 1981. The number has 
continued to be higher than that of tuberculosis and malaria in the 1990’s. Although tuberculosis and 
malaria attracted attention as re-emerging infectious diseases because of the emergence of 
drug-resistant types, R&D activities resulting in patent applications seemed to be extremely slow. 
There seem to be two factors that can potentially explain the difference in the number of innovations 
between HIV/AIDS and the other two diseases. First, it may be that demand is more important than 
necessity. As Schmookler [1966] pointed out, market size is an important determinant of the 
intensity of innovation in general. Even though the necessity of creating medicines to cope with 
malaria in developing countries is very high (see Table 1), the purchasing power of people in these 
countries is weak on average. Thus, the development of innovations in medicines for malaria is 
slower than that of HIV/AIDS, a disease that is also spreading in developed countries. Second, since 
HIV was discovered only recently, it is seen as an unexploited frontier in research and is deemed to 
be of greater interest than tuberculosis and malaria, diseases that were discovered some time ago and 
have been studied for a long time. Both factors seem to be at work in accounting for a difference of 
ten times the number of patent applications for HIV/AIDS innovations and those for the other two 
diseases. 
 
2.3. Patent Applications by Country of Origin and Status of Firm 
 
These days, patent application is so internationalized that many rely on either the Paris 
Convention or the Patent Cooperation Treaty. Figure 2 illustrates shares of the cumulative number of 
patent applications for medicines related to the three infectious diseases. These are organized by 
origin of applicant, and the Figure indicates that applicants from the United States, Japan, and 
European countries account for 90% of total for each disease.14 The United States has a large share 
of the total number of applications, not only for HIV/AIDS (a serious influence in the country), but 
also for malaria (except for military needs, meets a thin demand in the home market). This shows 
that the United States is a leader in this field of research. It is interesting that the number of 
applications by Japan is roughly equal to that of the United States with respect to tuberculosis, while 
the share of Japan for malaria is small. In terms of innovation by the Japan, the difference between 
tuberculosis and malaria is due to two facts: First, Japan has directed its efforts to the treatment of 
tuberculosis from World War II until the present. Second, there is no mosquito transmitting malaria 
on the mainland of the country, so malaria has not been a serious concern in Japan. There are some 
differences with regard to the type of infectious diseases, but innovations in medicines for the three 
                                                        
14 In the case of multiple applicants, the first applicant on the list is adopted. 
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diseases are dominated by the three poles: the United States, Japan, and European countries. 
It is notable that medicines are likely to be exempt from protection by patent in many 
countries. For example, patent law started covered medicines in 1975, even in Japan, where the law 
had been stipulated long ago. Since then, both public and private entities have applied for and owned 
patents of medicines in Japan. Now, which sector, public or private, leads in the innovation of 
medicines for the poor? Consumption of medicine is likely to have an external impact (externality) 
by reducing the rate of infection moving from infected persons to others (Philipson [2000]). The 
private sector is unwilling to work on unprofitable medicines for which the market is small because 
of low purchasing power of people in poor countries. Under these circumstances, the public sector is 
expected to play a key role in R&D activity for infectious diseases. However, Table 3 shows that a 
majority of patent applications are filed by the private sector for all the three diseases (see Table 4 
for the classification of public, university, and private entities). As for HIV/AIDS, the private sector 
accounts for more than three fourths of total applications. In contrast to expectation relative to the 
externality of infectious diseases and the unprofitable nature of medicines for the poor, it is evident 
that the private sector also leads in the innovation of medicines in developing countries.. 
Figure 3 shows trends in patent applications by sector. Regarding HIV/AIDS, private 
entities increased applications drastically in the middle of the 1980’s, while the growth of 
applications by the public entities and universities was very modest. With tuberculosis, there is no 
upward trend in applications by public entities, but universities and private entities gradually 
increased the number of patent applications over time. Private entities had a surge in applications in 
1998. With respect to malaria, private entities again showed an strong increase in the middle of the 
1980’s and maintained the level of innovation until 1995 when the next rise in applications started. It 
seems in terms of innovations in medicine, that public entities and universities cannot perfectly 
substitute functions of private entities. Cockburn and Henderson [2000] showed that there is a 
complementary relationship between the public and private sectors in R&D activity for medicines in 
the United States. They described a division of labor in which the public sector covered basic 
research while the private sector engaged primarily in applied research in order to make results from 
basic research practical and commercialized.15 Since scientists in universities and public research 
institutes may be more like to publish results of their research in scientific journals rather than apply 
for a patent, estimations in the data of this study may underestimate the contribution of public 
entities and universities to the innovation of medicines.  
 
                                                        
15 Evidence for estimating this cross correlation comes from data in this study and implies existence 
of a complementary relationship where private patent applications pick up after public ones become 
active. For example, in the case of malaria, the number of public applications three or four years ago 
correlates positively with present private applications. 
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2.4. Patent Applications by Firm 
 
Which entities in the public and private sectors filed the most patent applications? Who 
make innovations in medicine for diseases in developing countries when such innovations do not 
seem to make great profit? Actually, the motivation for innovation is not necessarily related to profit. 
A private firm may have a philanthropic mind. It may want to enhance its reputation, or it may use 
the experience of innovation as an investment for innovation in the development of another more 
profitable medicine. In any case, determination of which types of firms filed many patent 
applications may provide useful information for identifying factors that determine performance in 
innovation of medicines for the poor. 
From this perspective, data for patent applications by firm is analyzed below. Table 5 
shows the cumulative number of patent applications related to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and 
the neglected diseases,16 the four disastrous diseases that are rampant in low income countries. These 
applicants are arranged in descending order based on number of applications for HIV/AIDS. It 
appears that most major applicants are pharmaceutical firms such as GlaxoSmithKline, Aventis, 
Merck, Bristol Myers Squibb Co., and others. The number of patent applications for medicines 
related to HIV/AIDS that GlaxoSmithKline filed during the period is remarkable. The number for 
GlaxoSmithKline is almost twice that of the second firm, Aventis. What is even more surprising is 
that GlaxoSmithKline is also the top applicant for malaria and the neglected diseases, and it is 
ranked second for tuberculosis. GlaxoSmithKline is the top innovator for development of medicines 
to fight serious infectious diseases spreading in low-income countries. The prominence of 
GlaxoSmithKline contributes to a positive correlation in patent applications among the three diseases, 
as shown in Table 6.17  Are there any factors explaining the outstanding performance of this firm, 
and if so, what are they? 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 
What are the determinants of the large variation in patent application? Do common 
determinants of innovation in general explain the high performance of GlaxoSmithKline? Among 
major pharmaceutical companies, GlaxoSmithKline is relatively large in terms of sales and R&D 
expenditure. This could completely explain the prominent performance of the company. Since these 
medicines are unlikely to be profitable, ordinary variables that explain the extent of innovation may 
not significantly affect that of medicines for the diseases. Is there any firm-specific factor, other than 
controlling variables that are considered to affect invention of medicines in general, that leads 
                                                        
16 Details for this category of diseases are given in section 3. 
17 Once GlaxoSmithKline is dropped from the sample, the correlation coefficients become small and 
statistically insignificant. 
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GlaxoSmithKline to invent medicines for developing countries? 
 
 
3.1. Model 
 
The equation for estimation is one commonly used as a knowledge production function 
(see Jones [1995] among others): 
 .      (1) 21
ββ
itit
u
it SKeY iti
+= γZ
where i is the index of firms, and t is an index of years.  is an indicator of knowledge produced; 
 and  are measures of the stock of knowledge and production of the firm i.  is a 
vector consisting of other explanatory variables representing economies of scope, firm dummies, 
time trend, and a constant. 
itY
itK itS itZ
γ  is a corresponding vector of parameters. 1β  and 2β  are 
parameters of the elasticity of with respect to  and , respectively. Finally,  is the 
error term. 
itY itK itS itu
Griliches[1984], and Hausman, Hall and Griliches[1984] assume a Poisson distribution for 
the error term, with a similar representation of the equation in order to investigate the relationship 
between the number of patents and R&D. In this paper, the output of the knowledge production 
function, , is measured by the number of patent applications of medicines and vaccines for the 
diseases. Success in innovation is a rare achievement that takes place after long R&D activity. The 
number of patent applications is a non-negative integer and takes on values as a discrete dependent 
variable. Therefore, the Poisson distribution is appropriate for the error term. The probability density 
function of a stochastic variable 
itY
( )itY  following the Poisson distribution is: 
!
)()(
it
Y
it
itit Y
eYfYP
itit λλ −== ,      (2) 
where itλ  is the Poisson parameter standing for the arrival rate of success in innovation per year 
per firm. Note that the conditional mean is identical to the conditional variance according to the 
probability density function. The conditional mean is expressed as: 
]exp[][ βXX ′== ititititYE λ ,     (3) 
where  and are  vectors of regressors and parameters, respectively. The term k is the 
number of explanatory variables. Parameters are estimated by the maximum likelihood estimation 
method. Plugging equation (1) into equation (3), conditional expectation (4) below is derived.  
itX β ( k×1 )
[ ] [ ]ititititititit SKSK γZγZ explnlnexp 2121 ββββλ =++= . (4) 
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As in other studies, explanatory variables are divided into two classes: variables entered in 
logarithms and variables entered in levels. It is notable that while the parameters of elasticity with 
respect to  and  are itK itS 1β  and 2β , respectively, elasticity with respect to the j-th 
explanatory variable contained in  is .itZ jitj Zγ 18
The equalization feature of a conditional mean and variance is rarely satisfied with data. 
Variance is often greater than the mean of a discrete variable, and this feature is called 
“over-dispersion” in a Poisson regression model. In order to cope with the non-equalization problem 
between mean and variance, two methods have been developed. One is the Negative Binomial model 
(NB), and the other is the Zero Inflated Poisson model (ZIP). 
In order to derive the NB model, a stochastic variation in the Poisson parameter, itε , is 
used, and the Poisson model is modified as follows: 
( )itititit ελελ exp]exp[ ′≡+′= βX ,    (5) 
where )exp( itε  is assumed to follow a gamma distribution, ( )•Γ , with mean of 1 and variance of α. 
The probability density function is thus 
[ ] 1exp
)(
)( −−Γ=
θ
θ
εθεθ
θε itititg .     (6) 
where αθ /1= . The conditional probability density function is then 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
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X .   (7) 
The conditional mean of  is no longer equal to its variance. itY
itititYE λ′=][ X , and )1(]var[ ititititY λαλ ′+′=X .   (8) 
Unless the parameter α, which is called the “over-dispersion parameter”,19 is equal to zero, the mean 
and variance of the dependent variable in this model are distinct. 
The second model that takes account of the over-dispersion problem is the Zero Inflated 
                                                        
18 This is derived as follows: jit
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19 This formula is referred to as the Negbin2 model in Cameron and Trivedi [1986]. 
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Poisson (ZIP) model. This is designed to incorporate the feature of many zero counts in the 
dependent variable (Lambert [1992]). When a large number of zeros is observed for the dependent 
variable, the Poisson regression model underestimates the probability of zeros, and this may cause 
over-dispersion. The ZIP model allows for “excess zeros” by assuming that the data generating 
process is characterized by two regimes: one where the value always takes a zero count and one 
where it takes zero or positive counts generated by the Poisson process. These two regimes are 
described as follows: 
⎩⎨
⎧
− ii
i
it p
p
Y
1y  probabilitwith )(Poisson
   y    probabilitwith ,0
~ λ                  (9) 
Estimation with this model takes two stages. A probability density function of the logit model is 
applied to the first stage estimation. The second regime follows the ordinary Poisson model. 
Synthesizing the two stages of estimation, the probability density functions are as follows: 
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For the Zero Inflated Poisson model, the conditional mean and variance are described as follows:
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This model is thus able to incorporate the over-dispersion feature.  
It should be noted that the NB and ZIP models are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, 
the features of two models can be integrated, and the Zero Inflated Poisson model with negative 
binomial distribution is called the Zero Inflated Negative Binomial model (ZINB). The Vuong test is 
available for testing the validity of the ZIP model against the alternative model (Vuong [1989]). 
Suppose that the probability density function of the ZIP (or ZINB) model is denoted by )(1 iiYf X , 
and that of the ordinary Poisson (or NB) model is denoted by )(2 iiYf X . A test statistic is the log 
likelihood ratio,. ( )()(log 21 iiiii YfYfm XX= ) . More precisely, the Vuong statistic for testing the 
Zero Inflated Poisson model against the Poisson model is: 
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If v is greater than 2, the ZIP (ZINB) model is accepted. If v is smaller than -2, the Poisson (NB) 
model is accepted. If v falls in the range between -2 and 2, the test is indeterminate. 
 
3.2. Data Sets 
 
Diseases studied 
The knowledge production function can be estimated with the specification expressed in 
equation (1). Two data sets are used: one for HIV/AIDS and one for the neglected diseases. The 
former is the most acute and serious disease in contemporary developing countries, while the latter is 
a group of diseases that is also very serious and spreads exclusively in developing countries. For 
HIV/AIDS, a panel data set running from 1981 to 1998 was made up for 9 major pharmaceutical 
companies, i.e. Abbott Laboratories, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, Eli Lilly, F. Hoffmann - La 
Roche, GlaxoSmithKline, Merck, Novartis, Pharmacia, and Pfizer. The sample size of the panel data 
for HIV/AIDS was 162. Abbott Laboratories and Pharmacia were dropped from the data set for 
neglected diseases because each of the two firms has only a single patent application of medicine for 
the diseases. As a result, the sample size of panel data for the neglected diseases covering 1980-1998 
was 133. 
The category of “neglected diseases” was used as a dataset because of the small sample 
size for malaria. Since the number of patent applications of medicines for malaria was relatively 
small, the sample size of the panel data was also small. This was not the case for HIV/AIDS. Malaria 
is a representative disease among those that spread exclusively in developing countries, but 
HIV/AIDS is a global disease in the sense that many people with HIV/AIDS live in rich countries. 
Since it is important to study determinants of innovations in medicines for diseases spreading only in 
developing countries, and to compare them with global diseases, patent applications of medicines for 
other important and influential infectious diseases that are prevalent exclusively in developing 
countries were added to those for malaria. A new category called “neglected diseases” was thus 
created. 
The category of “neglected diseases” was “borrowed” from the homepage of a renowned 
non-government organization, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). MSF is an organization known to 
be a forerunner of international aid in medical activities. It undertakes activities to diffuse knowledge 
and information in medicines used in developing countries. In order to facilitate innovation of 
medicines for diseases which are rampant and very serious in low income countries, MSF designates 
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and publicizes information about the “neglected diseases”: malaria, human African trypanosomiasis 
(alias sleeping sickness), leishmaniasis and meningitis.20 This category suits the present analysis and 
is juxtaposed with HIV/AIDS. 
 
Patent application 
As explained in subsection 3.1, the proxy for knowledge produced is the number of patent 
applications (PATENT). Each application is dated by a priority date.21 However, the number of patent 
registrations is not suitable for this empirical analysis due to small sample size. Adoption of patent 
applications as a proxy for innovation can be used because the protection of an invention comes into 
effect on the date of the application (according to the first-to-file principle of the Japan Patent 
Office).22
 
R&D stock 
Explanatory variables are identical between the two sets (one for HIV/AIDS and one for 
the neglected diseases), even though the sample periods and the number of firms are different due to 
the availability of the dependent variable. 
R&D stock is used as a proxy for the stock of knowledge which each firm utilizes in order 
to make innovative activities. The R&D stock is constructed as the deflated and depreciated sum of 
R&D expenditure for all innovative activities of the firm according to the perpetual inventory 
method using a depreciation rate of 10%. The data were collected from either the Form 10-K or the 
annual report directed to stockholders of sample firms. All values were converted to U.S. dollars 
using the annual average exchange rate against U.S. dollar. The R&D expenditures are deflated with 
the biomedical research and development price index (BRDPI)23 that is constructed by the National 
Institute of Health in the United States. Sales are deflated with the pharmaceutical price index in the 
United States (See Appendix 2 for details). 
                                                        
20 Human African trypanosomiasis is a fatal parasitic disease carried by tsetse flies that affects about 
3-5 hundred thousand people in 36 countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Leishmaniasis is another fatal 
parasitic disease transmitted to humans through the bite of infected tsetse flies. Currently, at least 
twelve million people in the world are infected. The most serious type of disease is the visceral 
leishmaniasis known as “Kala azar”. This mainly spreads in five developing countries: Bangladesh, 
Brazil, India, Nepal and Sudan. Meningitis is transmitted through coughing and sneezing of infected 
people. It prevails particularly in the area referred to as the African meningitis belt which ranges 
from Senegal to Ethiopia. 
21 The priority date is the first filing date of a patent application to the patent office of a country.  If 
the applicant submits the same application to another country for a suspended period (one year in 
most cases), the latter application is treated as if it is filed in the second country on the priority date. 
22 There are some studies that use indicators of the number of patents weighted by intensity of 
citations in order to take into account the quality of innovation (Jaffe and Trajtenberg [2002]). 
Unfortunately, contrary to the US Patent office, there is no citation system in the Japan Patent office. 
23 This index is available on the web 
(http://www1.od.nih.gov/osp/ospp/ecostudies/economic_studies.htm). 
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There are two caveats for this variable: First, there have been frequent mergers and 
acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry. In order to handle this problem, a base year is set. The 
status for each sample company as of December 2002 is applied to the whole sample period. In other 
words, multiple firms that merged before December 2002 are treated as a single firm, and the 
number of patent applications, R&D expenditures, and sales are added respectively among the firms. 
Second, for any given firm, it is not possible distinguish R&D expenditures directed to development 
of innovations in medicines for the infectious diseases from those for other diseases and injuries. In 
other words, this variable captures only the general scale of R&D for each pharmaceutical firm. 
 
Economies of scale 
It is often hypothesized that large companies have an advantage over small ones in 
developing innovations. A justification for this hypothesis is that under the circumstance of imperfect 
financial markets, an invention is financed by profits and larger companies are good at exercising 
market power to raise profits. This justification was proposed by Schumpeter [1942]. On the other 
hand, the opposite view is that overall productivity should be lower for a large firm because of the 
diminishing marginal productivity of investment. In short, scale economy may or may not work for 
knowledge production. The economies of scale are estimated by the elasticity of knowledge 
production with respect to production within the threshold of the elasticity of unity. As a matter of 
fact, there is little general empirical evidence that supports economies of scale in innovation. As for 
innovation in medicines, Jensen [1987], Graves and Langowitz [1993], and Cockburn and 
Henderson [1996, 2001] report that they did not find economies of scale. The present research tests 
the hypothesis with the data set that includes medicines for the infectious diseases spreading in 
low-income countries. 
 
Economies of scope 
The performance of an R&D activity may depend on the intensity of similar activity in 
neighboring areas. Some knowledge drawn from research in adjacent fields may be beneficial. In 
other words, diversification in R&D within a group of medicines may positively affect the 
innovation of a certain medicine classified within that group. Generally speaking, an ascendancy 
associated with conducting variety in production is known as “economies of scope”. This can be 
interpreted to mean that conducting multiple research projects together by a single firm is more 
efficient than carrying out the same projects by various firms. For example, it is known that an 
important antiretroviral that is widely used as a medicine for AIDS was invented by applying 
knowledge gained from development of an anticancer drug. Engaging in developing an innovation in 
medicine for cancer enhanced productivity of innovations in medicines for HIV/AIDS. There is 
empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis of “economies of scope” in the area of pharmaceutical 
innovations. Cockburn and Henderson [1996, 2001] found positive and significant returns to scope 
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in research for ten major pharmaceutical companies. The same hypothesis for the infectious diseases 
spreading in developing countries is tested in this research. 
For proxies of economies of scope, the precedent of Okada and Kawahara [2004] is used. 
These researchers measured the breadth of R&D activities using the number of therapeutic classes 
where the firm has at least applied for a patent.24   There are 13 therapeutic classes and 
subcategories under each class. These are called “facets” in the International Patent Classification 
(IPC).25 In this study, the number of IPC facets where the firm files at least one patent application 
in a year (SCOPE) is used as a proxy for economies of scope. In order to elucidate the effect of 
economies of scope among medicines for infectious diseases, IDSCOPE is defined as the number 
of IPC facets with at least one patent application among the facets for all infectious diseases. The 
squared IDSCOPE, which is denoted by IDSCOPE-SQ, is also used to take account of non-linearity 
in economies of scope. 
 
Time trend and dummies 
The time trend (TREND) and firm dummies are added to the equation. Regarding firm 
dummies, GlaxoSmithKline is set to be the benchmark. The sample firms are numbered as follows: 
1. GlaxoSmithKline, 
2. Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS), 
3. Pfizer,, 
4. Merck, 
5. Abbott Laboratories, 
6. Novartis, 
7. Roche, 
8. Pharmacia, 
9. Eli Lilly. 
As a result, the general form of equation for estimation is the following: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )itititit SCOPESALESDStockRPATENT 1210 ln&lnln γββγ +++=  
( ) ( ) ( ) ittjj jit uTRENDFIRMDUMMYIDSCOPE ++++ ∑ = 49 2 32 γγγ?????? .  (14) 
 
 
                                                        
24 Cockburn and Henderson [1996, 2001], who explored the effect of economies of scope, used ,the 
number of research programs which were kept ,inside each firm and not open to the public. Even 
though the approach is interesting, it is not feasible in the present research. 
25 See Table A for details of the 13 therapeutic classes.  
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3.3. Results of Estimation 
 
Table 7 displays summary statistics for the two data sets. It should be noted that the 
standard deviation is far greater than the mean of the dependent variable (PATENT) for both 
HIV/AIDS and the neglected diseases. These observations suggest over-dispersion. The Negative 
Binominal (NB) model, the Zero Inflated Poisson (ZIP) model, and the Zero Inflated Negative 
Binomial model (ZINB) were then applied for estimation in addition to the standard Poisson (POIS) 
model. Results of estimation with the HIV/AIDS data are displayed in Table 8, while those of the 
neglected diseases may be seen in Table 9. The four combinations of explanatory variables, which 
deserve particular attention, are selected and numbered [1]-[4] in the tables. 
 
(1) Estimation for HIV/AIDS 
The logarithm of R&D stock, firm dummy variables, and time trend were used for all 
estimations, but the remaining explanatory variables, such as logarithm of sales and the measures of 
economies of scope, are included as ,explanatory variables in order to examine the effect of those 
variables on innovation. The estimation results of the standard Poisson model are shown in the first 
four columns. The coefficients of most of the explanatory variables maintain expected signs, and 
these are statistically significant (Table 8). An exception is the logarithm of sales; here, the 
coefficient is negative and statistically insignificant. 
There is some doubt about the validity of the standard Poisson model due to 
over-dispersion. Results of a Lagrange multiplier test for over-dispersion leads to rejection of the 
null hypothesis of equality between conditional mean and variance. In addition, over-dispersion is 
detected as a result of the NB estimation. A likelihood-ratio test of the over-dispersion parameter of 
the NB model with null hypothesis of 0=α  (bottom of the second four columns in Table 8) 
indicates that for the four combinations of explanatory variables, the alternative hypothesis of the 
over-dispersion may be accepted. Thus the negative binomial model is judged to be more appropriate 
than the Poisson model for this data set. 
It turns out that over-dispersion is perhaps better explained by the “excess zeros” feature of 
the Zero Inflated Poisson model than by the NB model. The Vuong statistics and their p-values are 
displayed in the second row at the bottom of Table 8. All values of the Vuong statistics are far greater 
than 2 for the eight patterns of estimation by the ZIP and ZINB models. This suggests that the ZIP 
and ZINB models that incorporate the “excess zeros” assumption are favored over the Poisson and 
NB models, respectively. Hence, the ZINB model appears to be the most consistent with regard to 
the over-dispersion feature of the data. 
All estimates obtained through the estimation are in general, appropriate. As expected, the 
signs of coefficients on ln(R&Dstock) are all positive, and estimates are all significantly greater than 
zero (except for those from the NB model). The values of estimated elasticity of patent applications, 
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with respect to R&D stock, exhibit relatively wide variation ranging from 0.55 to 1.93. However, the 
null hypothesis that the elasticity is unity is in no case rejected because of the large standard errors of 
estimates. 
Estimates of the coefficient on ln(SALES), which is a proxy for a firm’s scale, are negative 
but statistically insignificant for all specifications. This lack of significance is reinforced by the fact 
that the log-likelihood does not change greatly by adding ln(SALES) in all specifications (see Table 8 
for differences in log-likelihood between explanatory variable sets [1] and [2] using all estimation 
methods).26 This absence of scale effects for innovations in medicines for HIV/AIDS is consistent 
with the findings of Jensen [1987], Graves and Langowitz [1993], and Cockburn and Henderson 
[1996, 2001] in their studies on medicines in general. Because of its insignificance, ln(SALES) was 
dropped from the remaining estimations. 
Economies of scope are incorporated in two indicators: SCOPE and IDSCOPE. The former 
embodies the scope effect among all diseases and injuries, while the latter does so only among 
infectious diseases. As seen in Table 8, the estimates of coefficients for SCOPE are significantly 
positive for the standard Poisson and NB models while not significant for the zero inflated models 
(ZIP and ZINB).27 Estimates of the coefficient of IDSCOPE are always significantly positive 
irrespective of the combination of explanatory variables. The smallest estimate of the coefficient 
among all estimations is 0.247 for ZINB [4] where the equivalence of elasticity is 1.163. In summary, 
a positive impact of economies of scope on innovations in medicines for HIV/AIDS is detected 
among medicines for infectious diseases, but the same impact among medicines for all diseases and 
injuries is not confirmed. 
Another noteworthy finding on innovations in medicines for HIV/AIDS is the diminishing 
nature of economies of scope within medicines for infectious diseases. The explanatory variable set 
[4] for all estimation methods includes a quadratic term for IDSCOPE in order to account for 
non-linearity in the relationship between scope of R&D and innovations. Viewing results using the 
explanatory variable (set [4] in Table 8), the estimated coefficient of IDSCOPE-SQ is significantly 
negative. There is precedence for this result. When looking at R&D in pharmaceutical firms, 
Cockburn and Henderson [1996, 2001] found a similar relation between diminishing returns and 
scope for innovation of medicines in general.  
The sign and significance of the coefficient of TREND is altered according to the estimation 
method and model used. However, this instability may not matter; dropping TREND does not 
                                                        
26 There is some reservation regarding multicolinearity between R&D stock and SALES where the 
correlation coefficient is 0.77. However, SALES is not significant due to its correlation with Trend, 
even when R&D stock is dropped. 
27 Note that the inverse of the Herfindahl index was used as another proxy for economies of scope. 
This index incorporates information about how equally patent applications are distributed across all 
13 therapeutic classes (see Appendix 2 for details). However, the coefficient on this index does not 
reach significance for any specified equation and combination of variables. 
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dramatically affect the results mentioned above. As pointed out by Mairesse and Sassenou [1991] 
and Bassant and Fikkert [1996], it should be noted that R&D stock is likely to be correlated with 
time. Thus, it may be observed that the introduction of TREND somewhat lowers the coefficient of 
R&D stock. 
The impact of firm dummy variables is a major concern of this experiment. 
GlaxoSmithKline was set to be the benchmark used for comparison with other pharmaceutical firms. 
As seen in the first column of Table 8, even after the magnitude of cumulative R&D expenditure is 
controlled, the prominence of GlaxoSmithKline in the number of patent applications of medicines 
for HIV/AIDS is apparent. This is reflected by negative coefficients on all firm dummy variables 
when the standard Poisson model is used without any proxies for economies of scope (see POIS [1] 
in Table 8). Further, six out of eight firms have coefficients that are significantly negative. This result 
remains consistent when ln(SALES) is added as an explanatory variable (see the second column 
labeled POIS [2]).  
The prominence of GlaxoSmithKline is attenuated by either introducing proxies for 
economies of scope as explanatory variables (explanatory variable sets [3] and [4]) or by taking 
account of the possibility of “zero inflation” with ZIP and ZINB models. However, coefficients on 
dummy variables for three giant firms in terms of R&D stock,28 specifically Novartis, Roche and 
Pharmacia, tend to remain significantly negative. This empirical observation implies that the 
prominence of GlaxoSmithKline in innovation of medicines for HIV/AIDS is remarkable among 
pharmaceutical giants, even after the variable of economies of scope is taken into account and the 
probability of failure in innovation is augmented by adoption of the ZIP model. 
In fact, the significance of proxies for economies of scope and adoption of zero inflated 
models do not aid in understanding the mechanisms that led to the higher performance of 
GlaxoSmithKline. The strong and positive association between the number of patent applications of 
medicines for HIV/AIDS and the width in innovation of medicines for infectious diseases 
(incorporated in IDSCOPE) is consistent with the observation that GlaxoSmithKline files patent 
applications for medicines not only related to HIV/AIDS but also tuberculosis and malaria. It is a 
challenge for future studies to treat IDSCOPE as an endogenous variable and to explain the variation 
in the number of patent applications and IDSCOPE jointly. Further, “zero inflation” successfully 
reduces negative significance of dummy variables for relatively small firms for which the number of 
successful innovations is more likely to be zero. However, that methodology seems incapable 
changing the negative insignificance for larger firms. Although the prominence of GlaxoSmithKline 
is explained by introducing proxies for economies of scope and adopting the zero inflation models, 
the factors that explain the performance of this company, both for scale and scope in innovation of 
medicines for the poor, are still open for investigation. 
                                                        
28 Refer to Table 10 for the scale in R&D stock for each sample firm. 
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 (2) Estimation for the neglected diseases 
Another fundamental concern for this analysis is determining whether the mechanisms that 
affect performance in innovation of medicines is different between HIV/AIDS, which is a global 
disease, and the neglected diseases that are spreading only in low income countries Table 9 displays 
results for estimations related to the neglected diseases. In general, it may be concluded that almost 
all findings mentioned above for HIV/AIDS are applicable to innovations in medicines for the 
neglected diseases. In general tendencies differences between the two are rarely found. 
The same explanatory variables are used for estimations of HIV/AIDS and the neglected 
diseases, but the sample size is less for the neglected diseases due to the decline in the number of 
sample firms. As in the case of HIV/AIDS, the over-dispersion parameter is significantly different 
from zero (except for ZINB[4]), and the zero inflation hypothesis may be accepted using the Vuong 
test. 
Estimates of elasticity of patent applications with respect to R&D stock are distributed in a 
reasonable range between 1.16 and 1.43, unless IDSCOPE is introduced as an explanatory variable. 
The corresponding estimates of the standard errors are distributed between 0.55 and 0.75. Thus, 
estimates of elasticity are judged to be statistically significant only for some models, unless 
IDSCOPE is used. It is evident from the estimation results for HIV/AIDS that once IDSCOPE is 
introduced, the signs of estimates of elasticity turn negative, even though the negative difference 
from zero is not statistically significant. The scale effect, which is embodied in the coefficient for ln 
(SALES), is negative and statistically insignificant, as in the case for HIV/AIDS. 
An interesting difference from the results for HIV/AIDS is that the estimates of 
coefficients for IDSCOPE-SQ are significantly positive, while those for IDSCOPE are insignificant. 
This implies increasing returns to scope. However, this feature appears at the cost of an unreasonable 
value for the elasticity of patent applications with respect to R&D stock. Thus, the increasing returns 
to scope feature must be treated with skepticism. 
The effects of firm dummies are similar to those for HIV/AIDS. If only R&D stock is 
included as an explanatory variable, the coefficients of all firm dummy variables are estimated to be 
negative, and the impact of five out of six firm dummies are judged to be significantly negative. This 
significance becomes weak when proxies for economies of scope and adoption of the zero inflation 
models are introduced. However, such significance tends to consistently show up for large firms 
such as Novartis and Roche, unless IDSCOPE is introduced. Thus, the prominence of 
GlaxoSmithKline among large firms in the development of innovations in medicines for the 
neglected diseases is apparent, as it is in the case of HIV/AIDS. 
 
(3) Discussion 
Results of estimations show that economies of scope are exhibited in relations that exist 
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between research in medicines for the infectious diseases featured in the estimations and that for all 
other infectious disease. Firms that work with infectious diseases in general are superior in 
innovation for HIV/AIDS and the neglected diseases. For example, as seen in Table 10, the average 
values of SCOPE and IDSCOPE of GlaxoSmithKline over the sample period are the greatest among 
sample firms. GlaxoSmithKline has worked intensively on infectious diseases for many years, an 
outstanding achievement that currently gives it status in the field of innovations in medicines for the 
poor. This is reflected in Table 11, which shows the development pipeline of GlaxoSmithKline as of 
the end of 2003. Among all, it is remarkable that there are many medicines for tropical diseases such 
as dengue fever, leishmaniasis, meningitis, malaria, and rotavirus that are in the process of 
development at GlaxoSmithKline. Note that leishmaniasis and malaria are treated as neglected 
diseases in this paper. All told, these are reasons why the chief executive officer of GlaxoSmithKline 
is proud of the company’s supremacy in accumulated resources for invention of medicines for 
infectious diseases in low income countries (GlaxoSmithKline [2003]).  
What enabled the firm to succeed with such strength and depth of innovation? A key is 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) that have resulted in the current form of GlaxoSmithKline. It is 
widely known that most large pharmaceutical multinationals have expanded their scale of business 
through M&A. As shown in Figure 4, GlaxoSmithKline is an integration of several companies 
resulting from a series of M&A that took place for last two decades. Among all, because of its 
excellence in the field, the addition of Wellcome in 1995 was crucial in development of further 
innovations in medicines for infectious diseases. However, study of the background of M&A in 
pharmaceutical companies in detail is beyond the scope of this paper. In this study, a firm formed 
through M&A during the sample period was treated as if the firm in December 2002 had its form 
from the beginning. Exploration of the effect of M&A on innovations in medicines for infectious 
diseases that are spreading in low income countries must await future study. 
It is interesting that GlaxoSmithKline did not resort to a system of preferential treatment 
granted for developing innovations in medicines for serious diseases contracted by a small number 
of people. This is known as the “orphan drug” system and provides various incentives for sponsors 
to develop products for rare diseases in some countries (Thamer, Brennan and Semansky [1998]). 
The Orphan Drug Act of the United States, which came into effect in 1983, grants: (1) seven years of 
marketing exclusivity after approval of its orphan drug product, (2) tax credits for clinical research, 
and (3) funding for sponsors.29 Diseases treated by orphan drugs include tropical diseases that are 
hardly contracted by U.S. nationals. Some argue that the orphan drug system could work 
internationally to promote innovation of medicines and vaccines for diseases which are neglected but 
                                                        
29 The system is considered a great success. The cumulative number of designated orphan drug 
products is 1432, and 265 of these products received marketing approval as of December 2004. The 
Food and Drug Administration of the United States publishes data regarding designations and 
approval of orphan drugs on its web site (http://www.fda.gov/orphan/). 
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serious (Grabowski [2002]; Kremer [2000b]). 
GlaxoSmithKline did not aggressively use the above system. Only two medicines were 
approved as orphan drugs in the U.S, Retrovir for HIV/AIDS and Halfan for malaria (see Table 11). 
Thus, the orphan drug system does not seem to have created momentum for GlaxoSmithKline to 
develop medicines for low-income countries. It is difficult to determine why GlaxoSmithKline 
succeeded in filing an extraordinary number of patent applications related to medicines for the three 
killer diseases found in low income countries. 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
Now that there is consensus regarding lenient application of TRIPS for low-income 
countries, the price of medicines for diseases that are prevalent in low-income countries is gradually 
declining. The focus of institutional change, which are requested as a long-term solution to the 
problem of rampant infectious diseases, shifts to a problem of how to encourage the development of 
innovations in medicine for the diseases. There has been an expectation that the public sector leads 
such innovation because it is a matter of the “public good” to develop medicines for diseases when 
people have low purchasing power and live in low-income countries where they are susceptible to 
such diseases. Results of this research indicate that private companies have been dominant in 
applying for patents in that category of medicines. It seems that the private sector played a major 
role in the development of innovation in medicine, not only for patients in developed countries, but 
also for those in developing countries. As stated in Introduction, patents on medicines have been 
exempt from protection by patent (Lanjouw and Cockburn [2001]). This makes the above find 
particularly striking.? Even in unfavorable circumstances described above, private pharmaceutical 
companies have contributed to developing medicines for the diseases. 
On the other hand, it is well known that public research institutes and universities have 
contributed to both critical and fundamental innovations in the prevention and cure of HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, and malaria (Cockburn and Henderson [2000], Seytre [1995]). Dominance of private 
firms in patent applications combines with essential contributions of public institutions form a 
complementary relationship. As suggested by Cockburn and Henderson [2000], those in the public 
sector are likely to engage in upstream and scientific discoveries while those in the private may tend 
to deal with downstream and applied inventions. Rather than be filed as patents, discoveries made by 
scientists in the public sector are more likely to be published in scientific journals such as Nature and 
Science in order to improve researcher’s reputation. 
Results indicate that there is a great variation in the number of patent applications filed by 
pharmaceutical firms. In particular, GlaxoSmithKline, a giant pharmaceutical firm, is distinguished 
in its innovation of medicines for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. The prominence of 
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GlaxoSmithKline, which in this study is incorporated into firm dummies, is attenuated when the 
variable of economies of scope is introduced as an explanatory variable. However, if in addition to 
the number of patent applications, development of innovations in a wide variety of medicines is also 
used as a performance indicator of pharmaceutical companies, the good performance of 
GlaxoSmithKline becomes even more pronounced. 
GlaxoSmithKline had been criticized by NGOs for interfering in the access to medicines 
where patents were owned by the firm, and it started cutting prices of medicines for patients in 
low-income countries in 2001 (Oxfam [2001]). In a sense, however, GlaxoSmithKline was criticized 
because it developed many inventions in medicine for the treatment of infectious diseases spreading 
in low-income countries, and it kept a number of patents resulting from these achievements. Other 
companies could not be criticized since they did not have patented medicines for the diseases.   
Finally, it must be stressed that the mechanisms of innovation for HIV/AIDS and the 
neglected diseases are quite similar, even though there could be a difference in incentive for 
innovation due to a difference in purchasing power of respective patients. This research confirms 
that there is nothing special in the development of innovations of medicine for low income countries 
as compared with that for high income countries. As discussed in section 2, the development of 
innovations in medicine for low-income countries has been led by the private sector. Further, 
empirical analysis shows that innovation is closely associated with R&D and that the scale effect is 
invisible in innovation of medicines for the poor. These conclusions imply that the disincentive 
problem related to the lenient application of TRIPS, should be taken seriously. Otherwise, 
pharmaceutical firms may quietly retreat from what they see as unprofitable business.
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Appendix 1: The method of collecting patent application data from JPO 
 
The Industrial Property Digital Library (IPDL) is provided by the Japan Patent Office 
(JPO) which releases various information on the World Wide Wed.30  There are three main 
classification systems used to organize patent documents: (1) the International Patent Classification 
(IPC), (2) FI and (3) F-terms (File Forming Terms). IPC is an internationally uniform patent 
classification system formulated from a technological viewpoint. The FI system was originally 
developed originally by JPO in order to elaborate on the IPC so that an IPC search would become 
more efficient and convenient. FI includes some Japan-specific classifications. The F-terms system 
has a more detailed classification than the others, not only from a technological viewpoint, but also 
from a variety of viewpoints (objective, application, structure, material, manufacturing process, 
processing and operation method, control method, etc.). Combining FI with F-terms enables users to 
effectively extract more detailed data than in an IPC search. 
In order to retrieve patent application data on medicines and vaccines by disease, FI and 
F-terms systems were used jointly. First, a conventional formula for combination of FI and F-terms 
for HIV/AIDS in JPO was used.31  The authors adjusted the formula of HIV/AIDS for analysis. 
Second, some experimentation was conducted to determine appropriate FI and F-terms for each 
disease. The following formulas32 were constructed, and data were retrieved according to these 
formulas. 
Data for tuberculosis and malaria may include medicines and vaccines for other diseases 
because the formula for tuberculosis is based on “mycobacterium” which is a larger class of 
bacterium that includes tubercle bacillus, and the formula for malaria is based on “plasmodium” 
which contains the malaria parasite. There are no finer subcategories beyond mycobacterium and 
plasmodium. 
                                                        
30 http://www.ipdl.ncipi.go.jp/homepg.ipdl. 
31 The authors are grateful for instruction given by Haruo Matsumura and Ken Takeda. 
32 The plus sign “+” indicates a union of sets before and after the sign. 
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HIV/AIDS: 4B024BA35+4C084DC43+4C084ZC55+4C085BA69+4C086ZC55+4C087ZC55 
+4C088ZC55+4C206ZC55+C07K14/16+A61P31/18 
 F-terms or FI  
1 4B024BA35 Mutation or genetic engineering for human immunodeficiency virus 
2 4C084DC43 HIV protease inhibitors including enzyme-related protein substances  
3 4C084ZC55 Anti-AIDS drugs including enzyme-related protein substances 
4 4C085BA69 Bacterial antigens of HIV 
5 4C086ZC55 Anti-AIDS drugs that contain other organic and inorganic compounds 
6 4C087ZC55 Anti-AIDS drugs containing material from animals or micro-organisms
7 4C088ZC55 Anti-AIDS drugs containing plant substances 
8 4C206ZC55 
Anti-AIDS drugs including acyclic and carbocyclic compounds in 
medicinal compositions 
9 C07K14/16 Peptides having more than 20 amino acids and origin in HIV-1 
10 A61P31/18 Anti-HIV drugs 
 
Tuberculosis: 4C085BA09+4C087BC29+C07K14/35+A61K39/04+A61P31/06 
 F-terms or FI  
1 4C085BA09 Medicines containing mycobacterium for use as internal diagnostic 
agents 
2 4C087BC29 Medicines for mycobacterium containing material from animals or 
micro-organisms 
3 C07K14/35 Peptides having more than 20 amino acids with origin in 
mycobacterium 
4 A61K39/04 Medicinal preparations containing mycobacterium 
5 A61P31/06 Medicines for tuberculosis 
 
Malaria: 4C085BA06+ C07K14/445+ A61K39/015+A61P33/06 
 F-terms or FI  
1 4C085BA06 Medicines containing Haemosporidia antigens for use as internal 
diagnostic agents 
2 C07K14/445 Peptides having more than 20 amino acids with origin in Plasmodium 
3 A61K39/015 Medicinal preparations containing Plasmodium antigens 
4 A61P33/06 Anti-malarial drugs 
 
 29
 Neglected Diseases: (Malaria) + 4C085BA03+4C085BA04+4C085BA16+ A61K39/008 
+A61K39/095 +A61P33/02 
 F-terms or FI  
1 4C085BA03 Medicines containing Trypanosoma antigens for use as internal 
diagnostic agents 
2 4C085BA04 Medicines containing Leishmania antigens for use as internal diagnostic 
agents  
3 4C085BA16 Medicines containing Neisseria for use as internal diagnostic agents 
4 A61K39/008 Medicinal preparations containing Leishmania antigens 
5 A61K39/095 Medicinal preparations containing Neisseria 
6 A61P33/02 Antiprotozoals, e.g., for leishmaniasis, trichomoniasis, toxoplasmosis 
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 Appendix 2: Data sources and variable construction 
 
(1) R&D stocks 
R&D stocks are constructed using a perpetual inventory method. The stock at time t is 
equal to knowledge flow at time t plus the stock at time t-1 with depreciation: 
 1)1( −−+= ttt RRFR δ ,      (A-1) 
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where  is R&D stock at t,  is knowledge capital flow at t,  is real R&D expenditure 
at t-i, and 
tR tRF itE −
δ  is the depreciation rate (given at 10%). 
Let R&D expenditures transform into knowledge capital flow with a time lag θ. Define 
iµ  in equation (A-2) as: 
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Then, equation (A-2) is re-written as 
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In this paper, time lag is set to be one year. The benchmark of knowledge capital stock, , is 
constructed by assuming that real R&D expenditures in previous years have grown at an average 
annual rate of growth, g, for the sample period. 
tbR
 
δδ
δ
δδ
δδ
+=+
+=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
−−
=
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
−+=
+−+−+=
+
−−
g
E
g
gE
g
E
E
g
E
g
E
EEER
tt
t
ttt
ttttb
1
2
2
2
1
)1(
1
11
1
1
1
1
)1()1(
??
??
?? L
L
    (A-5) 
 
(2) Scope indexes 
The Japan Patent Office provides sub-categories of the International Patent Classification 
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(IPC) as shown in Table A, this sub-category is called the IPC facet. Referring to Okada and 
Kawahara [2004], 13 therapeutic classes are defined as seen in Table A. 
Three scope indexes were used in this paper: (1) SCOPE is the number of IPC facets for 
which at least one patent application is filled in a year. It is designed to capture the width of 
innovation activities of a firm for medical science as a whole. (2) IDSCOPE is the number of IPC 
facets in which at least one patent application is filled within the group of infectious diseases 
(displayed in the rows entitled “3. Anti-Infective Agents” in Table A). (3) To measure how equally 
R&D resources are allocated over IPC facets, the inverse of the Herfindahl index was constructed 
using the number of patent applications across 13 therapeutic classes. 
 ∑
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Table A: Definition of 13 Therapeutic Classes and IPC Facet Classification 
 Therapeutic class Facet Definition Therapeutic class Facet Definition 
ABF Antiallergic ADD Metabolic active drug 
ACD Respiratory active ADE Vitamine preparations 
ACE Respiratory stimulant ADF Vitamine A, D preparations 
ACF Bronchodilator ADG Vitamine B preparations 
ACG Antitussive ADH Vitamine B? preparations 
ACH Expectorant ADJ Vitamine B? preparations 
ADS Cellular tissue active ADK Vitamine C, P preparations 
ADT Cell-activating ADL Vitamine E, K preparations 
ADU Tumor inhibitor ADM Urea metabolic active 
ADV Antileukemic ADN Fatty metabolic active 
ABH Interferon ADP Antidiabetic
ADW Pathogenic organism active ADQ Antidote
ADX Antipathogen ADR Agents for habitual-poisoning 
ADY Antiviral AED Biologically active substances agents
ADZ Antimicrobial AEE Hormones for medical purposes 
AEA Antipathogenic-parasite AEF Pituitary hormone preparations 
AEB Antiparasitic AEG Thyroid and para-thyroid hormone 
preparations
AEC Anthelmintic AEH Adrenal hormone preparations 
ABY Hematopoietic AEJ Androgen preparations 
ABZ Blood substitutes AEK Estrogen preparations 
ACA Hemostatic ABA Agents for innate immunity 
ACB Anticoagulant ABB Agents for antibody production 
ACC Antianemic ABC Immune suppressant 
ABN Cardiovascular active ABD Adjuvant
ABP Cardiac muscle stimulant 11. Bone/Joint
disorder Agents
ABG Antirheumatic 
ABQ Myocardial depressant ACV Genitourinary active drug 
ABR Vasodilator ACW Urinary system agent 
ABS Coronary vasodilator ACX Diuretic agent 
ABT Vasoconstrictor ACY Hysterotonic
ABU Hypoglycemic ACZ Contraceptive 
ABV Hypotensive AAP Peripheral nervous system active drug
ABW Capillary stabilizers AAQ Agents for sensory nervous system 
ABX Antithrombolytic AAR Agents for motor nervous system 
ACJ Gastrointestinal active drug AAS Skeletal muscle relaxants 
ACK Agents for oral use AAT Autonomics agents 
ACL Antiulcer AAU Sympathomimetic 
ACM Stomachics and digestives AAV Sympatholytic 
ACN Antiobesity AAW Parasympathomimetic drug 
ACP Emetic AAX Parasympatholytic drug 
ACQ Lexative AAY Spasmolytic
ACR Antidiarrhoeal AAZ Hidrotic
ACS Hepatic/bile duct active drug
ACT Cholagogues 
ACU Dissolving of a gallstone
AAA Nervous system active drug
AAB Central nervous system active drug
AAC Central nervous depressant
AAD Anaesthetic 
AAE Hypnotic 
AAF Convulsant 
AAG Antipyretic 
AAH analgesic 
AAJ Central stimulant 
AAK Antidepression 
AAL Antiemetic 
AAM Improving brain function
AAN Antipsychotic 
ABE Antiinflammatory 
7. Central 
Nervous System 
Agents 
8. Metabolic/
Endocrine Agents
1. Respiratory 
Agents 
2. Anti- 
cancer/tumor 
Agents 
3. Anti-Infective 
Agents 
4. Blood Agents 
9. Hormonal
Agents
10. Immune
Agents
12. Genitourinary
Agents
13. Peripheral
Nervous System
Agents
5. Cardiovascular 
Agents 
6. 
Gastrointestinal 
Agents 
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Table 1: Infections of HIV, Tuberculosis and Malaria in 2000 
 Number of Deaths in 
2000 
Number of Newly 
Infected Persons 
Share of Infected People Living in 
Developing Countries in Total Infections
HIV/AIDS 3 million 5.3 million 92% 
Tuberculosis 1.9 million 8.8 million 84% 
Malaria More than 1 million 300 million Almost 100% 
Source: World Health Organization [2002], Introduction. 
 
 
Table 2: Damages of HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in 2002 
World Africa The
Americas
Eastern
Mediterranean
Europe East and
South Asia
Western
Pacific
A)      2821 2204 103 50 43 375 46
B)      5.8% 18.3% 2.2% 1.1% 1.1% 2.5% 0.7%
A)      1605 305 44 131 74 691 360
B)      2.4% 2.3% 0.6% 2.1% 1.1% 3.7% 2.2%
A)      1222 1088 1 57 0 65 11
B)      3.0%   10.8% 0.1% 1.6% 0.0% 0.6% 0.2%
A)      5648 3597 148 238 117 1131 417
B)     11.2% 31.4% 2.9% 4.8% 2.2% 6.9% 3.2%
HIV/AIDS
Tuberculosis
Malaria
Total
 
Note: A) The number of deaths due to each disease (unit: thousand). 
 B) Share of total DALYs lost in each region due to each disease. 
Source: World Health Organization [2002b]. 
 
 
Table 3: Cumulative Numbers and Shares of Patent Applications by Innovator for 1980-98 
?  Public University Private Total 
176 497 2835 3508 
HIV/AIDS 
(5.0%) (14.2%) (80.8%) (100%) 
20 102 220 342 
Tuberculosis 
(5.8%) (29.8%) (64.3%) (100%) 
80 271 920 1271 
Neglected diseases 
(6.3%) (21.3%) (72.4%) (100%) 
34 95 267 396 
?  Malaria 
(8.7%) (24.2%) (67.2%) (100%) 
Note: “Neglected diseases” consist of leishmaniasis, trypanosomiasis, meningitis, and malaria. 
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Table 4: Classification of Innovators 
Notation Definition 
Public Government and public institutions 
University 
Private universities and non-profit 
research institutes 
Private Private companies 
 
 
Table 5: Cumulative Numbers by Applicants 
Applicant HIV/AIDS Tuberculosis Malaria NeglectedDiseases
GlaxoSmithKline 277 12 53 115
Aventis 139 9 12 79
Merck 107 5 6
Pfizer 93 3 2 46
the USA 72 6 13 23
Bristol-Myers Squibb 64 2 2 6
Roche 61 6 12 37
Int. Pasteur 51 8 12 15
Abbot Laboratories 50 0 0 1
Sankyo 48 6 0 4
Novartis 46 2 0 18
Takeda 39 8 4 24
Pharmacia 37 1 0 1
Chiron 35 4 15 2
Bayer 33 1 7
Astra Zeneca 30 5 1 2
Boehringer Ingelheim 27 1 2 3
Eli Lilly 27 1 1 13
Wyeth 25 3 9
Human Genome Sciences 15 2 8 10
Corixa Corporation 0 22 0 4
46
7
31
31
 
Note: See note in Table 3 for neglected diseases. 
 
Table 6: Correlation Coefficients among Applications of Medicines for HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria 
?  HIV/AIDS Malaria Tuberculosis 
HIV/AIDS 1 ?
Malaria 0.831 1 ?
Tuberculosis 0.676 0.705 1 
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics 
 
(1) HIV/AIDS : 162 observations 
variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max
PATENT?AIDS? 4.71 7.27 0 56
R&Dstock 9268.4 5387.6 1446.1 25135.0
SALES 15506.7 6885.4 5647.6 35052.0
SCOPE 31.14 10.15 7 56
IDSCOPE 4.71 2.91 0 14
IDSCOPE-SQ 30.62 37.88 0 196
variable(Log)
ln(R&Dstock) 8.96 0.61 7.28 10.13
ln(SALES) 9.55 0.46 8.64 10.46  
 
(2) Neglected Diseases : 133 observations 
variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max
PATENT???? 1.89 2.75 0 19
R&Dstock 9534.3 5504.5 3095.1 25135.0
SALES 15954.1 7232.1 5647.6 35052.0
SCOPE 33.02 9.95 9 56
IDSCOPE 4.72 2.73 1 14
IDSCOPE-SQ 29.67 35.40 1 196
variable(Log)
ln(R&Dstock) 9.01 0.56 8.04 10.13
ln(SALES) 9.57 0.46 8.64 10.46  
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Table 8: Estimates of the Patent Production Function of Medicines for HIV/AIDS (N=162) 
POIS[1] POIS[2] POIS[3] POIS[4] NB[1] NB[2] NB[3] NB[4] ZIP[1] ZIP[2] ZIP[3] ZIP[4] ZINB[1] ZINB[2] ZINB[3] ZINB[4]
Constant -7.314*(3.361)
-4.648
(3.796)
-9.797**
(3.404)
-11.667**
(3.477)
-4.346
(8.156)
-1.324
(9.354)
-9.728
(7.971)
-10.645
(7.172)
-12.879**
(3.960)
-11.441**
(4.712)
-13.723**
(4.058)
-15.005**
(4.186)
-12.584
(6.583)
-11.577
(7.443)
-13.928*
(6.700)
-15.988**
(6.145)
ln(R& Dstock) 0.981*(0.391)
1.083**
(0.399)
1.056**
(0.393)
1.110**
(0.396)
0.551
(0.955)
0.680
(0.971)
0.865
(0.921)
0.865
(0.825)
1.747**
(0.464)
1.747**
(0.464)
1.800**
(0.468)
1.834**
(0.475)
1.707*
(0.769)
1.734*
(0.774)
1.793*
(0.771)
1.931**
(0.698)
ln(SALES) -0.370(0.243)
-0.427
(0.633)
-0.151
(0.270)
-0.129
(0.445)
SCOPE 0.042**(0.008)
0.040**
(0.008)
0.062**
(0.017)
0.057**
(0.015)
0.008
(0.009)
0.007
(0.009)
0.013
(0.013)
0.011
(0.012)
IDSCOPE 0.407**(0.057)
0.371**
(0.105)
0.259**
(0.058)
0.247**
(0.083)
IDSCOPE-SQ -0.019**(0.003)
-0.018**
(0.007)
-0.010**
(0.003)
-0.009
(0.005)
Firm 2: BM S -0.868**(0.278)
-0.975**
(0.288)
0.091
(0.333)
0.620
(0.344)
-1.158*
(0.608)
-1.274*
(0.633)
0.317
(0.703)
0.778
(0.653)
-0.330
(0.313)
-0.402
(0.339)
-0.122
(0.380)
0.413
(0.395)
-0.348
(0.502)
-0.395
(0.527)
-0.034
(0.592)
0.543
(0.557)
Firm 3: Pfizer -0.690**(0.202)
-0.742**
(0.206)
-0.201
(0.222)
0.085
(0.223)
-1.142**
(0.465)
-1.214**
(0.477)
-0.306
(0.495)
0.026
(0.459)
-0.293
(0.226)
-0.337
(0.239)
-0.186
(0.252)
0.172
(0.256)
-0.374
(0.365)
-0.403
(0.378)
-0.212
(0.398)
0.216
(0.371)
Firm 4: M erck -0.410(0.246)
-0.510*
(0.256)
-0.105
(0.253)
-0.056
(0.254)
-0.594
(0.545)
-0.789
(0.616)
-0.114
(0.548)
-0.116
(0.502)
0.052
(0.281)
-0.017
(0.307)
0.135
(0.294)
0.218
(0.297)
0.041
(0.450)
-0.012
(0.485)
0.150
(0.462)
0.244
(0.425)
Firm 5: Novartis -2.233**(0.239)
-2.209**
(0.237)
-1.858**
(0.253)
-1.179**
(0.281)
-1.916**
(0.653)
-1.876**
(0.659)
-1.459**
(0.630)
-0.835
(0.598)
-2.453**
(0.276)
-2.414**
(0.283)
-2.394**
(0.283)
-1.737**
(0.311)
-2.428**
(0.458)
-2.409**
(0.462)
-2.340**
(0.464)
-1.731**
(0.439)
Firm 6: Roche -1.457**(0.143)
-1.659**
(0.195)
-0.696**
(0.205)
-0.091
(0.221)
-1.076**
(0.338)
-1.334**
(0.509)
-0.113
(0.413)
0.273
(0.401)
-1.343**
(0.143)
-1.430**
(0.212)
-1.193**
(0.211)
-0.638**
(0.228)
-1.302**
(0.226)
-1.378**
(0.346)
-1.080**
(0.317)
-0.573
(0.311)
Firm 7: Eli Lilly -1.591**(0.358)
-1.925**
(0.421)
-1.004**
(0.378)
-0.610
(0.379)
-1.928**
(0.733)
-2.322**
(0.943)
-0.651
(0.796)
-0.382
(0.723)
-0.657
(0.407)
-0.832
(0.512)
-0.507
(0.435)
-0.111
(0.442)
-0.680
(0.624)
-0.810
(0.769)
-0.437
(0.668)
0.028
(0.615)
Firm 8: Abbott -0.674(0.442)
-0.872
(0.462)
0.424
(0.485)
1.287*
(0.512)
-0.973
(1.072)
-1.212
(1.132)
0.980
(1.148)
1.375
(1.021)
0.408
(0.510)
0.281
(0.558)
0.658
(0.571)
1.302*
(0.606)
0.450
(0.845)
0.366
(0.892)
0.852
(0.935)
1.506
(0.868)
Firm 9: Pharmacia -1.964**(0.176)
-2.067**
(0.190)
-1.099**
(0.243)
-0.896**
(0.251)
-2.042**
(0.353)
-2.155**
(0.394)
-0.747
(0.478)
-0.545
(0.448)
-1.768**
(0.177)
-1.818**
(0.198)
-1.595**
(0.253)
-1.401**
(0.263)
-1.772**
(0.254)
-1.815**
(0.294)
-1.509**
(0.366)
-1.321**
(0.351)
TREND 0.071*(0.031)
0.078**
(0.031)
0.054
(0.031)
0.012
(0.030)
0.163*
(0.072)
0.168**
(0.072)
0.120
(0.069)
0.071
(0.062)
-0.056
(0.038)
-0.049
(0.039)
-0.060
(0.038)
-0.098**
(0.038)
-0.050
(0.059)
-0.047
(0.060)
-0.055
(0.059)
-0.104
(0.055)
Over-dispersion
parameter
0.684**
(0.133)
0.681**
(0.133)
0.605**
(0.122)
0.468**
(0.108)
0.198**
(0.051)
0.198**
(0.051)
0.196**
(0.051)
0.132**
(0.040)
Vuong test of
zip(zinb) vs.
Poisson(nb)
z = 6.52
Pr>z =
0.000
z = 6.44
Pr>z =
0.000
z = 6.27
Pr>z =
0.000
z = 6.15
Pr>z =
0.000
z = 8.90
Pr>z =
0.000
z = 8.77
Pr>z =
0.000
z = 8.26
Pr>z =
0.000
z = 7.84
Pr>z =
0.000
Log-likelihood -433.0 -431.9 -419.6 -388.4 -350.9 -350.7 -343.5 -336.0 -304.6 -304.5 -304.2 -284.4 -275.5 -275.5 -275.0 -265.2  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .05 level, ** at the .01 level. Over-dispersion parameter tested using the likelihood-ratio test of 0=α . 
 37
Table 9: Estimates of the Patent Production Function of Medicines for the Neglected Diseases (N=133) 
POIS[1] POIS[2] POIS[3] POIS[4] NB[1] NB[2] NB[3] NB[4] ZIP[1] ZIP[2] ZIP[3] ZIP[4] ZINB[1] ZINB[2] ZINB[3] ZINB[4]
Constant -9.114*(4.650)
-6.198
(5.524)
-11.323**
(4.766)
-4.471
(5.684)
-7.794
(6.319)
-5.900
(7.340)
-9.645
(6.267)
4.985
(6.388)
-9.127
(5.142)
-6.225
(6.284)
-11.725*
(5.358)
3.095
(6.331)
-8.560
(6.075)
-6.694
(7.268)
-11.022
(6.232)
3.145
(6.446)
ln(R&Dstock) 1.224*(0.547)
1.316*
(0.560)
1.345**
(0.552)
-0.443
(0.658)
1.074
(0.743)
1.146
(0.754)
1.173
(0.728)
-0.514
(0.742)
1.225*
(0.606)
1.258**
(0.613)
1.432*
(0.619)
-0.241
(0.732)
1.162
(0.717)
1.191
(0.719)
1.358
(0.722)
-0.250
(0.746)
ln(SALES) -0.389(0.397)
-0.262
(0.521)
-0.336
(0.415)
-0.223
(0.478)
SCOPE 0.029**(0.012)
0.009
(0.012)
0.026
(0.015)
0.011
(0.014)
0.021
(0.012)
0.005
(0.012)
0.020
(0.013)
0.006
(0.012)
IDSCOPE -0.021(0.086)
-0.003
(0.099)
-0.061
(0.085)
-0.056
(0.089)
IDSCOPE-SQ 0.013**(0.005)
0.012*
(0.006)
0.014**
(0.005)
0.014**
(0.005)
Firm 2: BMS -2.169**(0.519)
-2.268**
(0.530)
-1.479**
(0.594)
-2.135**
(0.608)
-2.243**
(0.603)
-2.304**
(0.614)
-1.638*
(0.690)
-2.127**
(0.652)
-0.681
(0.539)
-0.821
(0.569)
-0.058
(0.641)
-0.665
(0.657)
-0.697
(0.600)
-0.780
(0.627)
-0.095
(0.714)
-0.657
(0.667)
Firm 3: Pfizer -0.606*(0.291)
-0.650*
(0.295)
-0.232
(0.329)
-0.589
(0.347)
-0.670*
(0.379)
-0.691
(0.380)
-0.336
(0.418)
-0.603
(0.384)
-0.332
(0.307)
-0.390
(0.316)
-0.167
(0.353)
-0.374
(0.369)
-0.353
(0.354)
-0.385
(0.360)
-0.048
(0.402)
-0.372
(0.375)
Firm 4: Merck -0.262(0.322)
-0.428
(0.365)
0.004
(0.340)
-0.908*
(0.386)
-0.318
(0.425)
-0.434
(0.483)
-0.114
(0.433)
-0.956*
(0.433)
-0.004
(0.344)
-0.166
(0.399)
0.239
(0.369)
-0.673
(0.423)
-0.030
(0.397)
-0.140
(0.461)
0.189
(0.419)
-0.675
(0.430)
Firm 5: Novartis -2.495**(0.432)
-2.429**
(0.433)
-2.308**
(0.446)
-0.636
(0.556)
-2.390**
(0.565)
-2.352**
(0.567)
-2.223**
(0.565)
-0.563
(0.628)
-1.826**
(0.429)
-1.739**
(0.443)
-1.772**
(0.434)
-0.295
(0.565)
-1.784**
(0.506)
-1.731**
(0.518)
-1.728**
(0.505)
-0.283
(0.577)
Firm 6: Roche -1.106**(0.197)
-1.311**
(0.287)
-0.652**
(0.275)
-0.122
(0.293)
-1.080**
(0.270)
-1.220**
(0.386)
-0.701*
(0.344)
-0.094
(0.337)
-0.989**
(0.202)
-1.162**
(0.294)
-0.687**
(0.265)
-0.233
(0.290)
-0.978**
(0.238)
-1.094**
(0.343)
-0.696*
(0.300)
-0.226
(0.297)
Firm 7: Eli Lilly -1.621**(0.506)
-1.964**
(0.617)
-1.023
(0.564)
-1.885**
(0.594)
-1.708**
(0.616)
-1.931**
(0.759)
-1.172
(0.680)
-1.897**
(0.645)
-0.739
(0.526)
-1.058
(0.661)
-0.235
(0.597)
-1.082
(0.632)
-0.775
(0.588)
-0.979
(0.735)
-0.279
(0.669)
-1.079
(0.640)
TREND -0.049(0.041)
-0.040
(0.042)
-0.072
(0.042)
0.003
(0.046)
-0.044
(0.054)
-0.039
(0.055)
-0.065
(0.054)
0.004
(0.051)
-0.048
(0.046)
-0.036
(0.049)
-0.075
(0.049)
-0.001
(0.053)
-0.047
(0.054)
-0.040
(0.056)
-0.074
(0.056)
-0.001
(0.054)
Over-dispersion
parameter
0.275**
(0.101)
0.271**
(0.101)
0.244**
(0.095)
0.101*
(0.070)
0.110**
(0.054)
0.107**
(0.054)
0.101**
(0.052)
-0.012
(0.041)
Vuong test of
zip(zinb) vs.
Poisson(nb)
z = 6.71
Pr>z =
0.000
z = 6.70
Pr>z =
0.000
z = 6.65
Pr>z =
0.000
z = 7.62
Pr>z =
0.000
z = 8.03
Pr>z =
0.000
z = 8.01
Pr>z =
0.000
z = 8.26
Pr>z =
0.000
z = 7.81
Pr>z =
0.000
Log-likelihood -219.3 -218.8 -216.5 -199.2 -209.0 -208.8 -207.5 -197.5 -165.3 -164.9 -163.6 -150.3 -161.3 -161.2 -163.6 -150.3  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .05 level, ** at the .01 level. Over-dispersion parameter tested using the likelihood-ratio test of 0=α . 
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Table 10: Characteristics of Sample Firms 
Minimum Mean Maximum Minimum Mean Maximum
Firm1 GSK 277 115 5064.5 11273.4 21386.1 11195.5 11313.8 28702.9 99.6% 45.5 7.4 2.46% 1.02%
Firm2 BMS 64 6 3345.1 6349.2 10179.4 12351.7 14126.7 18495.0 44.9% 23.7 3.2 1.01% 0.09%
Firm3 Pfizer 93 46 3613.2 7587.1 14377.4 14139.7 16942.8 22890.7 44.8% 33.5 4.7 1.23% 0.61%
Firm4 Merck 107 46 3818.0 6760.3 11052.9 7052.7 12933.5 26898.2 52.3% 37.4 6.7 1.58% 0.68%
Firm5 Novartis 46 18 15274.5 19264.3 25135.0 20953.1 27646.2 35052.0 69.7% 36.2 3.4 0.24% 0.09%
Firm6 Roche 61 37 7894.3 11397.5 16279.2 8913.5 12254.4 17510.0 93.0% 29.4 3.7 0.54% 0.32%
Firm7 Eli Lilly 27 13 3270.4 5580.7 8862.1 5647.6 7257.4 9432.6 76.9% 25.4 4.0 0.48% 0.23%
Firm8 Abbott 50 1 1446.1 3846.9 7814.7 6164.5 8984.2 13160.0 42.8% 19.1 2.9 1.30% 0.03%
Firm9 Pharmacia 37 1 6941.6 11355.9 16717.4 15406.0 18298.7 23500.7 62.1% 24.6 5.4 0.33% 0.01%
Average
IDSCOPE
AIDS?
R&Dstock
ND?
R&Dstock
R&D stock Sales R&Dstock
?Sales
Average
SCOPECode Name HIV/AIDS ND
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Table 11: GlaxoSmithKline’s Development Pipeline for Infectious Diseases at the End of 2003 
PHASE ? PHASE ? PHASE ? Marketed
HIV Hepatitis E Rotarix  (rotavirus) Havrix  (hepatitis A)
Dengue fever Malaria Streptorix (S.pneumoniae) Engerix B (hepatitis B)
N. Meningitidis Twinrix (hepatitis A & B)
Cervarix (HPV) Infanrix (diptheria, tetanus, acellular pertussis)
Tritanrix (diptheria, tetanus, whole cell pertussis)
Pollo Sabin (polio)
Priorix (measles, mumps and rubella)
Typherix (typhoid)
Hiberix (haemophilus influenzae type b)
Mencevax ACW (meningitis)
Non-NRTI Ziagen & Epivir Retrovir
CCR5 antagonist Epivir
Aspartyl protease inhibitor Combivir
NRTI Ziagen
Trizivir
Agenerase
Lexiva/Telzir
CDA (chlorproguanil, Tafenoquine Malarone
dapsone + artesunate) Halfan
Lapda ?
Tuberculosis
Sitamaquine Zentel (de-worming agent)
 (visceral leishmaniasis) Pentostam  (visceral leishmaniasis)
Vaccines
HIV/AIDS
Malaria
Other
 
Note: Italics indicate brand names of medicines and vaccines. 
Source: GlaxoSmithKline [2004] 
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Figure 1: Trends in Patent Applications for Medicines for HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
for 1980-1998 
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Notes: The vertical axis indicates a logarithmic scale. 
 
Figure 2: Share of Cumulative Number of Patent Applications for Medicines for the Three Infections 
Diseases by Origin of Applicants 
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Figure 3: Trends in Patent Applications by Public and Private Organizations and Universities 
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Figure 4: GlaxoSmithKline’s M&A 
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